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The use of cross-sectional data to estimate models of consumer or
household behavior or to evaluate public programs has a long and continuing
tradition in economics (e.g., Feldstein (1978), Meyer and Wise (1983),
Johnson (1983), Pencavel (1984)).

The treatment of cross-sectional or

area-specific variation in prices or program characteristics as exogenous
would appear, however, inconsistent with the Tiebout hypothesis (1956) that
agents,hetetogenous in preferences or endowments,locate in response to and/or
select local program levels according to those preferences.

If so, cross

sectional correlations between the observed behavior of agents and relative
prices or program levels will not correspond to true price or program effects
for any individual agent.
While some studies have shown that local laws reflect the preferences of
local populations (Landes (1980), Farber (1984)), such studies appear to assume
that interregional differences in population preferences are exogenous.
Heterogeneity and selective-migration imply, however, that site-specific changes
in prices or programs, whatever their source, will alter endogenously the char
acteristics and size of the population at the site, possibly inducing conse
quences unanticipated by the law-makers.

Todaro's classic article (1969)

presents a theoretical example in which non-selective migration thwarts the
intended effects of an urban job creation~ minimum wage program.

A local

program altering relative prices, however, may also induce countervailing
£hanges in the population via migration selectivity; e.g., a locality initiating
a program subsidizing health care might attrac·t low-health households. · Lack of
attention to selective migration thus makes inferences about the effectiveness
of a program to be implemented nationally based on local program initiatives
potentially misleading.
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Despite the importance of location-choice selectivity in local public
goods theory and in the evaluation of public programs, there have been few
attempts to ~est directly for the existence of selective migration (an
exception is Schultz (1983) )or to test predictions for how mi~ration responds
selectively to changes in relative prices. 1

Yet, how the characteristics of

agents change across activities or locations in response to relative prices,
i.e., the selectivity rules, are clearly dual to the price-theoretic implica
tions for the observable· behavior of a given agent and thus are themselves
subject to verification.

2

In this paper we consider how a price change or

program subsidy that is location or site-specific affects the composition
of residents via selective migration and biases evaluations of the effective
ness of the local program.

In particular, we assess the consequences of a

site-specific_ program subsidizing human capital investment in terms of shifts
in both population composition and a representative household's resource
allocations,when optimizing households that are heterogenous in preferences
and in their endowments of human capital are free to choose locations in
response to changes in location-specific prices.
In Section 1 the theoretical framework is described and implications are
derived for how population preferences and endowments shift within a locality
in response to the human capital subsidy.

We show that under plausible assump

tions and under all forms of heterogeneity a program subsidizing investments
in children attracts high-income households with small families; children in
such households, ceteris paribus, may exhibit low or high levels of human
capital, however, depending on whether the principal source of heterogeneity
is in tastesor endowments.

The relationships between the biases in estimates

of the program effects and sources of heterogeneity that arise from selective
migration are also derived.

In Section 2, unique longitudinal data from
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Colombia describing the consequence s of a local health subsidy program
are used to test the implication s of migration selectivity .
confirm the existence of selective migration.

The findings

The child health care

program evidently induced in-migratio n by households characterize d by high
income but, within income groups, households with low-fertili ty and low
child health were attracted to the program site.

These migration patterns

are shown to be consistent with the hypothesis that heterogenei ty in health
endowments dominates that in tastes within the population.

We also show

that as a consequence of this form of heterogenei ty, the effectivene ss of
the program based on cross-child differences in health and program exposure
is considerabl y overestimat ed when selective migration is not taken into
account.
1.

Modeling· Migrant Selectivity
a.

Heterogene ity and Migration Selectivity : - Who Migrates?

Consider an economy consisting of heterogenou s households in spatial
equilibritm1 :
household,
location.

all potential profits from migration are zero; i.e., no
net of migration costs, can increase its income by changing

Decisions by households are characteriz ed by the static, lifetime

optimizatio n problem in which the ith household maximizes
(1)

i
i
U (H, N, Z;
a),
i

i

where Ni= number of children in household i, Hi= average human capital of
children in i, Zi = composite consumption good and a is a vector of household
specific taste parameters, subject to the human capital production function

4
i

i

where X is the per-child human capital input, B is the household's technology parameter, andµ i is the household's human capital endowment, and
the lifetime budget constraint

where Yi is income, Px is the input price and PN the pr-ice of a child.
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Assume that all prices are identical across all locations but that at
a particular site a program is initiated which pays a subsidy s per unit of
the human capital purchased input.

Each household not at the program site now

faces a potential migration decision.

If the household migrates to the site,
S
Si
the price of the human capital input is PX and lifetime income is Y , .where
si
y
is income at the program site net of the cost of migration and the program tax, which is assumed to be lump-sum and levied on all residents.
i . i

Let V(PX, Y; a,

i
B,

i

µ) be the indirect utility function derived from

maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3); the difference in utility dV between
migrating and not migrating is then:
(4)

dVi

i

i

= av dP + av dY
aPX

X

c)yi
'
av/apv
Roy's identity, i.e., - X = av/aY=, yields the migration decision rule
(5)

migrate iff

8
where P~ < PX, Y < Y.

If the subsidy is proportional to PX<:~= (1-s) PX)
1

and migration cum program costs are proportional to income (; ,

.

this reduces to
(6)

migrate iff

.

= (1-C 1 ) Y1 )

Ci
>-,
s

namely that the household migrates if and only if the income share of the
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human capital input is at least as large as the ratio of the proportio nal
migration cost to the proportio nal input subsidy.
condition for migration to occur is that C < s.
(PS= P
X

Notice that a secondary
If the subsidy is absolute

- s) and the migration cost is also absolute (YS
X

i

• Yi - Ci),

then the decision rule is
(7)

Ci
migrate iff Xi > - .
s

Migration rule (7) can be used to derive the rules for migrant selectivi ty
by allowing the fundamen tal taste, technolog y and endowment parameter s to
vary in response to changes in relative prices while holding constant the

level of the utility differen tial between the origin

and program sites.

The characte ristics of the "margina l" migrant household , the household that
is just indiffere nt between moving to the site or not migrating , must change
with migration costs C or the site subsidy s according to:
(8)

df' =

<!~) -l <! dC -

C2

ds) ,

r

=

a,

e,

µ, y

s

where superscri pts are dropped to indicate that (8) describes a change in
the type of household rather than the response of a given household .
Clearly, from (8), any characte ristics of the household that increase
the demand for the human capital input X must increase as C increases or
must decrease ass increases in order to maintain the indiffere nce.

To

discover how the observabl e characte ristics of migrants vary with the
program subsidy and/or migration costs it is thus necessary to specify
how the unobserva bles a,µ and 6 affect .household decision rules.

Rosenzwei g

and Wolpin (1982) treated the special case where the human capital endow
ment is. additive, i.e., H = H(X; B) +µ,and derived general expressio ns
for the influence of the endowment on the human capital input and on fertility ,
namely

6

(9)

__

dKi. , PX
_
d1}

Hi

X

j

[-Hi

i

(dK) + ~ ]
1
xx dPX
dY

Hi

>

X

o,

Hi

xx

< 0

Ki= Xi, Ni.

The effects of lJ on the demand for X and N thus depend on the usual
Hicks-Slutsky compensated price and income effects.

If the fertility and

the human capital of children are Hicks-Slutsky substitutes, as has often
been found (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)), and income effects are
small relative to price effects, then a reduction in migration costs and/or
an increase in the site subsidy would attract migrants with both higher human
capital endowments and larger family size.

If income effects dominate price

effects, and are positive, then lower migration costs or a higher site sub
sidy induce, within income groups, less-endowed and lower-fertility in-migrants.
To generate predictions regarding the consequences of tastes and endow
ment heterogeneity for migration selection due to the initiation of a site
specific program subsidy requires thatadditional structure be imposed on the
household problem.

Consider a model in which the utility function is quadratic

and the technology is linear for each household i:

(10)

i

.2

1

a 4x

.

+ a\z

.

i

1
-

(l

.2
6

21

-and

which when solved in terms of the exogenous parameters yields the demand
equations:

(12)
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(13)

where~

i

s

1

8

2
(a

i

i
2
i
2 + a 6 PN ), ¢

most empirical findings,

X

s

a

i

i
2
2a 6PX > 0.

Note that, in accord with

and N vary inversely.

Assume that there is potential (1.lllobserved) population heterogeneity
in a

and a , reflecting preferences for family size and human capital, and
3
1
in the endowments l-l and
Prior to the introduction of the program, the

a.

program-site and potential migrant populations are on average identical
with respect to these fundamental parameters.

As the subsidy is raised

the ceter~s paribus changes in these taste and endowment parameters and in
income (Y) that will characterize the marginal migmnt, from (8) and (12),
are given by (14):

(14)

dY
_.,.
ds

2
2
1 6PN + a 2 ~a5 - 2a6Y))] [2s a 4 (a4~ + ¢) ]·
Four polar cases with respect to heterogeneity are of interest: _Suppose

:: •-BCll> [{a - 2µ:x ) {¢ + ¢) + 2Ba PX
4
4
3

{tt a

first that the populations are heterogeneous only with respect to tastes for·
family size and human capital investments in children.
a

i

1

or a

i

3

differ across households.

Specifically, let onlr

From (14), as the subsidy increases, the

8

migrant population as it becomes less selective will be composed of increasingly
higher a

1

and increasingly lower a

3

households.

If tastes are the only source

of heterogeneity, observationally identical migrant households will thus have
fewer children who on average will be of higher "quality", since dN/da ,
1
dX/da > 0 by construction, and
3
dNi

a6PNPX

da~ = - 2B(a ~ + ~) < O
4
(15)

With heterogeneity in the additive health endowment 'I.I only, increasing
the subsidy and thus reducing selectivity will draw households with higher
endowments, since more endowed households, for given money income, will have
a lower demand for X:
. (16)

In contrast to the tastes heterogeneity scenario, lower-l.l households, despite
their higher demand for human capital inputs, will always have children
characterized by lower levels of human capital, as
(17)

When there is heterogeneity in the additive endowment, migrants attracted by
the program subsidy will thus be observed to have lower levels of human
capital.

They will also have, as in the first case, fewer children since,

as indicated in (7), high-X households always migrate and, from (13),

·x

and

N vary inversely.
When heterogeneity exists solely in
households may have either
ion (14)).

B,

the return to the input X, in-migrant

lower or higher levels of human capital (express-

However, whether or not high-B (and thus high-H) or low-B (and
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thus low-H) households demand higher levels of the X input and thus migrate
to the program, such migrant households will have smaller families. 4

A

human capital subsidy program will thus tend to attract and to serve dispro
portionally households within income groups characterized by low fertility
whether heterogeneity exists in tastes or in human capital endowments.
If the principal source of heterogeneity is in the latter, however, the
program may attract, within income groups, households with lower levels of
human capital, while tastes heterogeneity implies that the program will
principally serve children already characterized by higher levels of human
capital.
Independent of any heterogeneity in unobserved, fundamental parameters,
however, if income effects are positive (as they are in the ~del), migrants
.will have relatively high income.

In the third polar case of no heteroge_neity,

migrants will thus tend to have larger families and children with higher
levels of human capital, as long as.the program contains no means test pro
visions, but within income groups migrant and resident households will appear
identical.
b.

Program Effectiveness and Program Effects

Consider now the problem of evaluating a human capital subsidy program
when the program is located at a specific site and migration is potentially
self-selective .

The average human capital h in a population of obser

vationally identical migrants and residents at the program site is given by:

where fM and fR are the relative proportions of (post-program) migrants
and (pre-program) residents in the population respectively and~ and hR

10
are their average human capital levels.

Note that 11M is the truncated

mean of the non-site and site populations when such populations have the same
distribution prior to the program.

A change in the subsidy, s, will induce

a change in the average human capital stock according to:
(19)
where YR and yM are the respective average program subsidy effects on the
levels of human capital in the resident and migrant populations; i.e.,
-8dX/dPX, dfM/ds is the shift in the proportion of migrants in the popula
tion due to a change in program attractiveness, and d1\i/ds is the change in
the mean human capital of the migrant population due to migrant selectivity;
Le., (dr/ds) (dh/dr) from (8), where r = a, ll, 8.
The total effect of a change in the locally-implemented prog~~m subsidy
on the average human capital in the site population, given by (19), thus
depends on (i) the direct effect of the subsidy on human capital investments
by the original, resident population, (ii) the magnitude of the compositional
change in the population via migration that is induced, weighted by the differ
ential in mean human capital levels between the migrant and resident populations,
(iii) the magnitude and.sign of the difference in mean program effects in the
two sub-populations, and (iv) the changes in the mean human capital of the
migrants caused by the arrival of new, selectively drawn migrants, who
will differ from those migrants already present.

The average "effectiveness"

of a program subsidy, the effect of the program if it were not site-selective
(provided in all sites ("globally")) is given only by the first term in (19),
if all pre-program site populations have the same mean characteristics or
if the pre-program site population is representative.

It is thus clear that

the bias in the estimate of program effectiveness based on the program's
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site-specific effects, given by the sum of the last three terms in (19),
will depend on the source and magnitude of heterogeneity in the overall
population and on household decision rules.
In the case in which taste heterogeneity dominates (variation in
a ), the expression for the bias,
3

derived from the model described by

(10) and (11), is:
(20) dh
ds

where a M and a R are the mean human capital taste parameters for
3
3
migrants and residents. The selectivity equation (14) implies, as noted,
that migrants will have higher average tastes•for human capit~l

a R).
3
3
Thus the first term in (20) is positive, since a higher subsidy attract·s
(a M >

more high-a

and thus high-H migrants (dfM/ds > 0). Moreover, the (high-a )
3
3
5
migrants react more positively to a subsidy than do residents. The last
term in (20), i.e., da M/dS, from (14), multiplied by d\i/da M' from (11)
3
3
and (12), is negative, .however, reflecting the marginal decrease _in the
selectivity of the migrant population associated with the higher generosity
of the subsidy. 6 Since this last term is a second-order effect, (20) implies
that the estimated effect of a site-specific subsidy on human capital will
represent an upper bound estimate of the effectiveness of the same program
applied globally when variation in preferences for human capital is the
principal source of population heterogeneity.

Due to tastes heterogeneity,

locally-implemented human capital subsidy programs will thus appear more
efficacious t_han they really are for the average or representative
household.
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When heterogenei ty is confined exclusively to endowments, however,
the bias derived from the model cannot be signed even when the source of
heterogenei ty is the additive endowment.

(21)

The bias in that case is:

dh
ds

+

f

f3Cq>
M 2 •
s "'

where µMand µRare the mean human capital endowments in the migrant
and resident populations .

In this case, as was shown, the subsidy attracts

low-endowment (and low-health) migrants (µM < µR); however, the human
capital investments by (less-endow ed) migrants respond more strongly to the
subsidy than do those by residents.

.

~

net contributio n of the negative
.

composition al· change and the positive different.1a l in subsidy effects
to the program effect bias cannot be predicted.

When endowment variation

is predominan t, then, no inferences about the globally applied program
effect on human capital can be made from the estimates of the site-specif ic
program effects, unless migration selectivity is taken into account.
Therefore unlike in the previous case, when there is endowment heterogene ity,
a human capital subsidy program could lower the average human capital in the
population at the site in which it is implemented as a result of migration
selectivity even if it augments the human capital of any randomly-se lected
household.
Similar expressions can be derived for the selectivity biases in the
estimated effects of a human capital subsidy on family size.

In both the

tastes and additive endowment heterogenei ty cases, selective migration will
lead to a negative bias--the human capital subsidy attracts low-fertili ty

13
households in both cases, as was shown, and the negative response of fertility
to the subsidy is stronger in both the low-~ and high-a households, who make
3
up the migrant population. Selective migration is likely to make a site
specific human capital subsidy program appear more anti-natalist than a similar
but globally-applied program.
2.

Empirical Application
a.

Migrant Selectivity

To test the migration selection hypotheses requires a data set that at
a minimum identifies migrants and residents at a specific site or sites and
provides the characteristics of both groups before and after the implemen
tation of and/or changes in a public program.

In 1968, a program

providing home-based preventive and maternal child health services was
initiated in

a small

village in Colombia, Candelaria, and detailed longi

tudinal information was collected from 1968 to 1974 on the characteristics
of parents an~ on the health of children aged less than six.

All households

present in Candelaria at any time during the seven-year period with a
child under six years of age·were included in the program, in which nurse
volunteers ("promotoras") visited each household approximately every two

·7

months.

Since Candelaria is a small village which serves in part as an

"intermediate" stopover for many migrants from outlying rural areas to
Cali, information on opportunities in Candelaria is disseminated relatively
rapidly in outlying areas and in-migrants make up a significant proportion
of the population.

While the Candelaria data are thus unique in pent4tting

identification of in-migrants and residents and in providing pre-program,
baseline data on both migrants (at time of entry) and residents, there is

14
no information on the characteris tics of migrants at origi~ or of the
general origin populations .

Thus, the health of the children of in-migrants

to Candelaria can only be compared to Candelaria residents, although com
parisons of the fertility of migrants with non-Candel aria, origin populations
are feasible, given the availabilit y of the 1973 Census of Colombia. 8
Pre-migrati on characteris tics must also be estimated.
In order to test for the existence of as well as to characteriz e the
source of migrant selectivity , if any, arising from the incentives created
by the Candelaria program, we need to compare, within observation ally
identical groups, the pre-program family size and some measure of the pre
program human capital of the children of migrants (households who came to
Candelaria after 1969) and residents (households residing in Candelaria when
the program was initiated in 1968)

We use the age-standar dized weight of

children as a measure of human capital, sin~e weight is the only health
outcome collected in all years of the program.

Because the standardiza tion

required is one that is independent of the program and relevant to the
population studied, the average weight in 1968 of (resident) Candelaria
children for each age-sex group is used as the standard; that is, the
age-weight distributio n in effect at the initiation date .of the program.
Since some ages (in months) were not represented in this group and others
had relatively small sample sizes, a fourth-orde r polynomial regression of
these mean age-specifi c weights for each sex group was used to smooth
the base.

A child's weight-for- age was thus defined· as the ratio of the

·weight at his/her own age to the standard weight at that age.
Table 1 provides the sample characteris tics of resident and migrant
families.

As hypothesize d in the previous section, migrant households have

higher (age-standa rdized) incomes on average, although the slope of the
migrant age-income profile is less steep for migrants.

Migrant families also

Table 1
Sample Characteristic:

Variable/Statistic
Pre-program children
ever born
Pre-program mean child
weight-for-age, 0-6
Income

Resident and Migrant Families

Resident Families
Mean
S.D.

2.75

4.49

Migrant Families
Mean
S. D.

2.46

3.22
.997

.151

.994

.129

959

371

1130

597

304

1007

594

.134

6.88

• 319

Income when entered
720
p_rogram
6.53
Log of income, father
aged 20 years
Slope of log-income
.0198
profile, fat her
aged 20 years
Curvature di log-income -. 791
profile (x16-3)
Years_ of schooling2.54
mother
Years of schooling2.76
father
Age of mother
28.3

.00857
.383

.00705

.0154

-.617

.430

1.52

2.66

1.63

1.58

2.98

1.54

6.31

26.2

6.88

Age of father

34.6

8.97

32.1

8.38

Mean program exposure
of children 0-6
(months)
Mean proportion of.
lifetime children
exposed to program
Number of families

18.4

6.32

10.8

7.36

.213

.619
208

.295

.475
280
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had fewer children than resident families prior to entering the program and
lower fertility than that for all rural households in Colombia (1973 Census
of Colombia).

While this differential conforms to the prediction of the

theoretical analysis that low-fertility households would be most attracted
to a program subsidizing human capital investments, whatever the principal
source of heterogeneity, migrant parents are also on average younger, more
educated and wealthier than resident parents.

Differences in family size

may thus be due to these differences in observed characteristics and tests
for selectivity must be performed within observationally identical groups.
Estimation of the household demand equations for fertility and health is
thus required to investigate the sources of heterogeneity and selection.
As was demonstrated, the existence of heterogeneity in tastes, tech
nology and/or.endowments implies that all of the coefficients of household
demand equations will be family-specific.

This suggests the following

estimating relationship:

where Ki is either the pre-program children ever born or (log) weight,;..for
age variable for family i, Xi is the set of exogenous characteristics of the
household conditioning these choices, g i is the family-specific parameter
vector, and. £i is a random term.
It is assumed that:

(23)

where
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This is the standard random coefficients model; the estimating equation (22)
may be written as

where£ i*c (g 1 - y) Xi + £ i •

Since the£ i* 's are heteroscedastic, a general-

ized least squares (GLS) estimator will yield consistent and efficient
estimates of the p's and o's.

Selectivity implies that the means of the

family-specific parameters y will differ across the migrant and resident
populations.
The demand equations (24) must be aodified to take into account the
_life-cycle nature of fertility and child health investment decisions, not
incorporated, for simplicity, in the models of the previous section.
First, health is a stock that is presumably a function not only of current
inputs but of all inputs applied in the past,and current family size
also reflects past fertility decisions.

Thus, the reduced form health and fertilit)

demand functionswill contain the determinants of all current and past inputs.
Second, in a life-cycle context with perfect foresight, input demand,
health demand and fertility decisions at any point in the life-cycle will
depend on future, current, and past income and prices.

Log income age profiles

were thus estimated for residents and migrants separately using all reported
income data points over the seven-year sampling period and information on
occupation, age and schooling attainment.
For migrants, as noted, income prior to migration is unavailable.

To the

extent that there is an important structural shift in the income profile associ

ated with migration, the profiles of migrants may be misrepresented.

To ascertain

if this absent information could account for any differences in parameter esti
mates obtained across the migrant and resident populations, we also estimate

17
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a child health equation based on the subsample of children born after the program was begun and/or after migration to Candelaria.

For this subsample.

children of the same age do not differ with respect to their exposure to the
program and information on actual family income is available for every year
of the child's life whether the child is from a migrant or resident household.
The household log income profile is measured by· three statistics:
the constant in the log income equation evaluated at husband's age

c

20, the first derivative evaluated at husband's age= 20 and the second
derivative.

These terms differ in the sample by the level of husband's

education and husband's occupation.

Mother's schooling is included in

( 24) as an observable characteristic that may shift tastes, technology
or endowment parameters.

Mother's age is also included in the children

ever born equation as a life-cycle standardization ; it is not included in
the weight-for-age equation, since that is already appropriately age
standardized.
Table 2 presents the relevant random-coeffic ient GLS demand equation
estimates, the first column for fertility (children ever born) prior to
entry into the program and the second column for the pre-program (log of)
mean child weight-for-ag~ .

The third column

reports 0LS estimates for

the (log of) standardized c~ild weight for children born after program
entry.

Only 0LS estimates are reported for that subsample because the GLS

procedure produced a large ~umber of negative variance estimates of household
specific parameters.

The reported t-values in column 3 may therefore be

biased, although the coefficient estimates are consistent.
The three specifications reported include only an intercept dummy variable
taking on the value of one for resident households in order to distin~ish

Table 2
Migrant Selectivity, Family Size, and Child Health
Dependent Variable:
Variable/
Estimation Procedure

Children Ever Born
at Progtam Entry
Random Coefficient-GLS

Log of. Mean Child Weight b
for-Age at Program Entry
Random Coefficient-GLS

Post-program Children:
c
Log of Mean Weight-for-Age
OLS

Resident

.565
(2.90) 8

.0209
(1.lO)a

.046~
(2.46)

Mother's schooling

-.416
(3.60)

-.00505
(0. 41)

-.00764
(0.64)

Income level (log)

.269
(0.30)

.155
(1.81)

.150
(1.82)

Income slope

-9.25
(0.42)

(O.

1.62
80)

• 986
(0.51)

-.639
(1.42)

-.814
(0.02)

(0 .18)

-7.09
(1.16)

-1.07
(1.85)

-1.03
(1. 86)

.489

.037

.035

Income slope derivative
Age of mother
Age of mother squared

5.97

.409
(11.6)
-.00185

(3.70)
Intercept

R2
n

a
b
c
d

456

458

303

Asymptotic t-ratios beneath regression coefficients.
Children born before the family entered program.
Children with full program exposure +since birth; i.e., born after the family entered the program.
t-ratios beneath regression coefficients.
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migrant s from residen ts.

Regress ions which are fully interact ive with respect

to the residenc e dummy, as are indicate d by the theory, were also estimate d,
but are not reported since the overall story is unchange d with the more par
simonio us specific ation.

Most of the estimat es of the individu al interact ion

coeffic ients were not measured with much precisio n; however , F-tests reject
at the five percent signific ance level the hypothe sis that the migrant and
residen t pre-prog ram demand equation s are identic al.

Migrant selectiv ity is

indicate d.
The set of residen t dummy coeffic ients reported in Table 2

conform to

the scenari o in which endowment heterog eneity dominat es tastes hetero
geneity .

Within income/ schoolin g groups, migrant s to Candela ria had both

Y

lower pre-prog ram family size and children with lower age-stan dardized weight
upon entry an~ after compared to residen ts.

These; findings thus suggest that

the immigra nts drawn to Candela ria were selected not only fromthe upper tail
of the income distribu tion (Table 1), but, within income groups, were self
selected from the lower tail of the endowment (µ) distribu tion. 9

Evident ly,

the slightly higher child weight observed for migrant s at entry in Table 1
is due.to the higher househo ld income of migrant s;

the estimate d income

level coeffic ients in columns 2 and 3 confirm that higher income househo lds
value health human capital more highly (one-ta il test, five percent level).
b.

Evaluat ion of the Effectiv eness of the Candela ria Program

The single- site sample design of the Candela ria data set would appear
to preclud e any evaluati on of the promoto ra program , since all househo lds
face the same subsidy .

However, in a life-cy cle context

the total subsidy

varies across children to the extent that children of the same age were
exposed to the subsidy for differen t lengths of time, a greater number of
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health inputs being subsidized for children within the same age group but
exposed earlier to the program.
in the total program subsidy:

There are thus two sources of variations
First, since the dissemination of information

about the Candelaria program to outlying areas and migration itself takes
time, children of migrants, while facing the same subsidy as the children
of residents when they arrive, will not be exposed to the program for the
same length of time, given their ages, as resident children.

This differ

ential is evident in Table l; mean months of program exposure for migrant
children is less than 60 percent that of resident children.

Since our

results indicated that migrant children have lower health (due to selection),
use of the cross-child variation in program exposure to assess the impact
of the program without attention to migrant selectivity would appear to
result in an upward bias in the estimate ofprogram effectiveness.

However,

we also showed that low-~ households may respond more positively to a human
capital subsidy; the direction of the selectivity bias in the program exposure
estimate is thus ambiguous.
The second source of variation in program exposure arises from variation
in the birth dates of resident children who were born prior to the program
(1968).

For such children, the sample would appear to approximate an

experimental design as long as the program was unanticipated.

However, since

children born at later dates on average are born later in their parents'
life-cycle, the cross-sec'tional variation in program exposure among resident
children may also be correlated with their health endowments or with parental
preferences for health, if these characteristics also influence the timing
10
and spacing of births. A relationship between program exposure and health
might thus exist in the absence of any true program effect even among children
11
of residents.
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To assess the consequences of migration selectivity for estimating the
effectiveness of the Candelaria program thus requires attention to both
sources of potential bias arising from the use of exposure infonnation to
measure subsidy differentials.

The longitudinal data on the health of

individual children permits this separation.

Consider the reduced form

estimating equation for child-.specific health:

i.
.
ij
where HJ is the health of child j in family i, E is the length of program

exposure, yij is a random coefficient on exposure, µj is a child-specific
health endowment, and Eij is a random time-varying health component.
other family characteristics are suppressed for simplicity.

All

Population hetero

geneity implies that yij differs across children if health endowments

differ, since, as we have shown, the effect of son the demand for the human
capital input X depends upon fundamentai parameters.

Program exposure,

which depends on the child's date of birth and/or on the timing of migration,
may be correlated with the unobserved health endowment as a result of timing
and spacing decisions and migration selectivity.

With multiple observations

for each child, however,·a random coefficients fixed effect estimator can
be used to purge out the family and child-specific health endowment.12
Rewriting {25) in differential form yields

GLS estimation of equation {24) provides a consistent estimate of the program
exposure effect for the sample of resident-household children.

However,

if migrant-household children are included in the sample, the distribution
of the Y1]
.. 'swill be truncated when migrant households are not randomlvJ
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drawn.

This leads to the standard sample selection problem, since

E[(yij - y) M:ij + 6Eijlmig rant]; O.
To obtain a consisten t estimate of the program exposure effect, and
thus the effective ness of the program, it is thus necessary to restrict
attention to resident children born prior to the program or to attempt to
correct for the sample (migratio n) selection .

We refrain from employing one

of the standard sample selection correctio n procedure s (Heckman, 1979; Olsen,
1980) since that would entail imposing further, and arbitrary , structure on
the problem.

The resident subsample should be large enough to permit precise

estimatio n of the program exposure effect and thus an assessmen t of bias due
to selective migration .
Table 3 reports estimates of the program exposure effects for both the
full sample o~ children (inclusiv e of migrants) and the sample of resident
children.

Estimates from two specifica tions are reported, a linear speci

fication in which the exposure effect is assumed to be identical across
education /income groups and an interacti ve specifica tion, which allows
exposure effects to differ by parental characte ristics, as is consisten t with
our linear-qu adratic example. 13 Both specifica tions are estimated using
ordinary least squares and the GLS random-c oefficient fixed effect estimator
FE-RC).

For both samples and both estimatio n procedure s, however, F-tests

reject the linear specifica tions; Table 4 reports the per-month exposure
effects on standardi zed weight by income levels implied by the interacti ve
estimate s.
Compariso ns across samples and across estimates permit

an assessmen t

of the separate roles of migrant selectivi ty and within-gr oup heterogen eity.
Whatever ·the specifica tion or estimatio n procedure , however, estimates

Table 3
Migrant Selecti vity and Program Exposure Effects on Log of Child
Weight- for-Age
Sample:
Estimat ion.Proc edure

Migran ts+ Residen ts
OLS
F.E..
F.E.

OLS

Exposur e (IIOllths x 10-2 )

.116

(10.S8)8

-1.S9
(1. 95)8

Log of income, father
· at age 20

.136
(7.77)

.0977
(3.72)

Income slope

l.69
(3.9S)

1.30
(1.98)

Income curvatu re

33.7

.408
(37 .63)8

-1.67
(2 .02)8

· 41.9 ·
(3.67)

(4.54)

OLS

OLS

.0736
(S .S6)8

-4.99
8
(O. 43)

.118
(4.38)

.104
(2.45)

2.21
(3.90)

1.58
(1. 77)

47.9

(4.86)

68.0
(4.30)

llesiden ts
F.E.-R.C . F.E.-R.C .
.O'l9l86

3.57 b
(5.36)

(0.11)

.Schooli ng mother: more
.00227
than one standar d
(0.34)
deviatio n beloiJ
the mean (1) ·

.00S09
(0.51)

-.00184
(0.20)

· -.00593
(0.40)

Schooli ng: within one
standar d deviatio n
below the mean (2)

-.00711
(O.SO)

-.0107
(0.80)

-.0110
(O.S2)

Schooli ng:
(3) .0285
within one standar d
(0.21)
deviatio n above the
mean (2)

-.0172
(0.87)

.00376
(0.20)

-.0290
(0.99)

Income x exposur e

.00241
(2.13)

.00296
(2.60)

.000572
(0.35)

-.00487
(5.24)

Slope x exposur e

.0216
(0.76)

.023S
(0.83) .

.0296
(0.87)

.0208
(1.07)

Curvatu re x exposur e

- •.549
(1.15)

-.915
(1.96)

-.991
(1.61)

.0036S

(.0.38)

3.23
(13.0)

Schooli ng (1) x exposur e

-

-.103
(0.2S)

-.377
(0.90)

.150
(0.27)

-1.55
(4.27)

Schooli ng (2) x exposur e

-

.682
(1.14)

.485
(0.80)

1.02
(1.29)

-2.42

.230

1.55
(1.42)

-2.57
(4.10)

(xl0- 3)

cxio-3>

Schooli ng (3) x exposur e

-

(xl0-3)

Interce pt

n

a
b

.124
(1. 48)

-1.02
(8.00)

-.6S7
(3.48)

.036

.033

1S83

1S83

(0.27)

.188

6126

-.804
(4.16)

(2.20)

.021

.023

.193

6126

4S40

Absolut e values oft-rat ios beneath regress ion coeffic ients.
Absolut e values of asympto tic t-ratio s beneath regress ion coeffic
ients.

(4 .86)

-.669

4540

.0001
1877

.031
1877

Table 4
Exposure Effects by Income Level: Percent Change in
Standardized Weight per Month 8
Exposures
Estimation Procedures

Migrants+ Residents
Fixed Effect
OLS

Residents
Fixed Effect

OLS

Two o above the mean

.00.81

.376

.015

.015

One o above the mean

.0056

.337

.0071

.080

.0005

.145

Mean

-.057

.298

One o below the mean

-.089

.258

-.008

.211

Two o below the mean

-.121

.218

-.016

.276

a Evaluated at mean mother's education.
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from the sample including both migrants and residents greatly

overstate

on average the health consequences of program exposure net of migration
selection effects, with the greatest differential displayed by the fixed
effect estimates.

14

Moreover, the patterns of exposure effects by income

revealed by the fixed effect estimates taken from the resident and full
samples are quite different (Table 4) -- the per-month exposure effects
decline by income group in the full sample but inc·rease with income in the
·
15
resident sample.
The fixed effect random coefficients model estimated in the residents
only sample, which is presumably free of selection and heterogeneity biases,
indicates that a child exposed for 1.5 years to the Candelaria program
(the sample mean for residents) and

who lives in a household with an

income level two standard deviations below the Candelaria mean would
experience a five percent gain in weight-for-age; a similarly-exposed
child from a household with income at the mean would experience a 2.6
percent increase in weight-for-age, while children from households with
incomes more than two standard deviations above the mean would benefit
little from the program.
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The comparable full sample estimates imply

that migrant selectivity leads to an overestimate of the program exposure
effectby 2400 percent among households with incomes at least two standard
deviations above the mean, and a 106 percent overestimate at the mean,
while the exposure effect is understated by 21 percent among households
with incomes less than two standard deviations below the mean.

The program

thus appears to have benefited most the children of poor residents and wealthy
migrants, and to have attracted, among wealthy potential migrants, those
who benefit most from the program and, among poor potential migrants,
those who benefit least.
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3.

Conclusion
When agents are heterogeneo us, a change in relative prices within a

discrete geographica l area or activity has two distinct effects.

It alters

the allocation of resources by each agent facing the price change and changes
the composition of agents within the location or activity.

While most

empirical studies have been concerned with testing the allocative responses
of a representat ive agent to changes in incentives, the change in the
spatial distributio n of differentia ted agents in response to area-specif ic
conditions, the central implication of the Tiebout hypothesis, has received
little theoretical development or empirical verificatio n.
have explored the consequence s of a

In this paper we

site-specif ic program subsidizing

human capital investments in children for both the spatial distributio n of
heterogenou s ·households and

for the level of human capital investment by

a representat ive household.

We show that with plausible restriction s on

the optimizing behavior of each household, such a program precipitate s in
migration by high-income and low-fertili ty households, whether the principal
form of heterogene ity is in tastes or in human capital endowments.

With

endowment heterogene ity dominant, however, households also characteriz ed
by low levels of human capital and/or with smaller returns to investments
in human capital are attracted to a program subsidizing human capital
investment.
Data from a village in Colombia that implemented a subsidized health
program confirm these implication s of selective migration-- in-migrants were
evidently drawn from the low-tail of the family size distributio n, were
of relatively high income and,within income groups,had children whose
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nutritional status was lower than that of observationally identical members
of the resident population.

As a consequence, evaluations of the program

inattentive to migration selectivity based on differences in program ex
posure across children born prior to the program were shown to significantly
overestimate the impact of the program for any randomly-drawn household.
Program evaluations based on comparisons of the mean nutritional status
of children born after the program with that of children born prior to
the program and never exposed to it, however, would seriously understate
the effectiveness of the program due to the selective migration of low
endowment households.

Indeed, the empirical results suggest that it is

possible that the equilibrium mean health of children in the village, due
to migration, will be lower after- than before th~ health program, with mean
health levels-increased in areasexternal to the program sit~.

Our

empirical results suggest that in a country such as Colombia or

the Un_ited States where the population is highly mobile, tests of theories
of the behavior of individual agents based on cross-sectional data or
studies of the determinants or consequences of laws based on the exogenous
spatial distribution of population characteristics may be seriously flawed.
The existence of migration selectivity has implications beyond those relevant
to the estimation of behavioral models from·cross-sectional data or to
the evaluation of location-specific programs, however.

Consider a national

immigration policy, for example, that does not discriminate by an immigrant's
country of origin.

Due to differences in migration costs (distance) and

in relative prices across potential sending countries, immigration will be
differentially self-selective across country-of-origin groups.

Such dif

~erential selectivity will result in the observed behavior of immigrants
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being correlated with their country-of- origin (Chiswick (1978)) even if the
distributio ns of population characteris tics in sending countries are identical.
Moreover, our framework implies that an overall increase in barriers to
immigration makes immigration more selective.

How immigrants differ by

country-of- origin or whether the laissez-fai re selectivity arising from
the decision-ru les of optimizing potential immigrants are superior or in
ferior to selection imposed by law depend on the sources of heterogenei ty
and the nature of the relative price differentia ls across the sending and
receiving countries.

If immigrants are principally attracted by a country's

superior opportuniti es for human capital investment, for example, our results
imply .that immigrants may be drawn from the lower tails of the human capital
endowment distributio n; however, the less so the smaller-the direct costs
of immigratin~ .
Finally, selective migration is a component of a broader class of
problems.

For example, as for migration, relative price changes as well

as income growth may selectively alter fertility decisions, resulting in a
change in the distributio n of children across households of differing endow
ments and preference s for human capital investment, and thus in the endow
ments of the representat ive child.

The long-term consequence s of national

programs may thus differ significant ly from their immediate effects due
to selectivity in fertility decisions.
would appear warranted.

The further study of selection rules
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Footnotes
1.

Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982).test and confirm an implication of selective
migration, that the variance in voter preferences for local public goods
expenditures are smaller within than among urban localities, but do
not test whether and/or how the local electoral outcomes affect residen
tial mobility.

Schultz (1983) tests for and confirms differences in

behavior between migrants and residents in Colombia by origin and
destination but does not incorporate migration decisions within his
behavioral model or derive predictions for how interarea price differ
ences generate selectivity rules.
2.

While heterogeneity and selection, c.ombined with information asymmetries,
form the basis for many models of behavioral phenomena (e.g., Spence
(1973);. Guasch and Wei,ss (1981)), that liJerature has seen little empirical
application.

Heterogeneity and selection are also explicitly recognized

in most econometric studies of labor supply behavior; however, selectivity
is essentially treated as a nuisance rather than as a testable implication
of the theory (an exception is H.eckman (1974)).
3.

The budget constraint ignores the interaction between the human capital
of children and the number of children, as in Becker and Lewis (1973).
Use of the non-linear budget constraint does not alter any of the
testable implications of the model (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)).

4.

It is easy to demonstrate that households with higher returns to the
human capital input X will always have higher levels of human capital.
However, the higher return induces both an income effect, lowering the
demand for X so as to allocate the higher wealth to the increased con
sumption of other goods, and a price effect, which raises the demand for
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X.

Note that the additive endowment only carries with it an income

effect; higherµ households are wealthier and have healther children
but do not obtain more human capital per unit of the input.
The subsidy effect on health, from (12), is

5.

-1 -1
i
i
·
i
- (¢ - Ba4w) (a2a 5 - 2a 2a 6Y +
dh /ds = 8[2w(a 3 - 2µ a 4 ) a 2a 6PXB a 4

from which subsidy-effect differentials can be computed when a andµ differ.

=

=

2
8C/s.

6.

d1\i/ds

7.

The program was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development;

(da M/ds) (dhM/da3M)
3

Candelaria residents and in-migrants thus did not incur any direct program costs.
Various health programs had been in operation in Candelaria before, but not

8.

after, the implementation of the "promotora" program.

.As a consequence,

rates of malnourishment and fertility in Candelaria were lower than in
the overall population in Colombia prior to 1968 (Heller and Drake (1979).
Since in our sample only post-1968 migrants can be identified, recent
but pre-1968 migrants attracted to the prior health programs will be
counted as residents; differences between residents and post-1968
migrants will thus underestimate the selectivity induced by a health
subsidy progr:am.
As noted above, the existence of pre-1968 programs minimizes the esti

9.

mated,. health differential between the post-1968, migrants and the pre-1968
residents in Candelaria since some proportion of the latter were attracted
•.-

by,.'the·' prior health programs.

However, while the estimates in Table 2

are thus lower bound estimates of the migrant-resident health differential,
it is possible that migrants are not drawn from the lower tail of the
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health endowment distribution characterizing the non-Candelaria origin
populations, since these populations exhibit lower mean health than do
the residents in Candelaria.

The Colombian Census data indicate that

post-1968 migrants to Candelaria do exhibit lower fertility than in the
rural population as a whole as well as in the Candelaria resident
population.
10.

That spacing patterns are related to household health endowments in
Candelaria households is shown in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1984).

11.

Heller and Drake (1979) exploit differences in program exposure among
children to evaluate the effectiveness of the Candelaria program.

They

ignore the selectivity associated with both migration and parental
spacing decisions.

Their specifications estimate program exposure

effects conditional on such endogenous variables as parental breast
feeding, use of medical services, and food expenditures; their findings
thus cannot be compared with our reduced-form estimates.
12.

A within-family (cross-child) fixed effect estimator would not provide
consistent estimates if endowments differ among children and the spacing
of children responds ·to realization; of child-specific endowments.

In

that case, a child~s health outcome will affect the interval to the next
child so that the difference in program exposure between children within
the same family will be related to their relative health as part of the
family's optimization process and regardless of the program.

Evidence

on these dynamic spacing patterns is presented in Rosenzweign and Wolpin
(1984).
13.

The subsidy effect, given in footnote 5, depends on fundamental parameters
as well as on income.
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14.

Similar results are obtained when the fraction of the child's life during
which he or she is exposed to the program is used to measure exposure.
With either measure, identification of the program effect arises from
the nonlinear relationships among age, exposure and weight induced by
the age/sex standardization .

15.

These differential program effects by income level are not due to program
design but reflect the nonlinearity in income of the input demand
equation.

16.

Part of the impact of the program appears to work via encouraging greater
and/or more rapid investments in children.

Fixed effect (legit) estimates

indicate that children of the same age but exposed longer to the program
were more likely to be receiving breastmilk and to have received innocu
lations_agains t diptheria, polio or tetanus.
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